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ABSTRACT
The Federal Government is actively involved in encouraging the formation and
growth of private pensions and in regulating their behavior. The primary form of
encouragement is the government's tax subsidization of pensions. A primary
attribute of pension plan provisions is an implicit tax on employment after
certain ages. The primary form of pension regulation is through ERISA, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The government's involvement in
encouraging and regulating private pensions appears to reflect its desire that
workers have a secure source of old age income which will lessen their reliance on
Social Security. In recent years the government has reacted to demographic
changes, and their effects on Social Security funding, and the increase in early
retirement by also using its pension and Social Security tax and regulatory
policies to encourage workers to delay their retirement decision.
This paper examines the structure of pension plans with two questions in
mind. First have government pension backloading regulations aimed at assuring
future pension benefits been effective? and, second, has the structure of old age
pension accrual at the end of the workspan, an implicit tax, greatly limitedthe
effectiveness of government policy in reversing the trend to early retirement?
The answers to these questions are important for assessing the benefits of the
government's tax subsidization of pensions, as they are currently structured.
The principal findings of this study are:
(1) ERISA regulations notwithstanding, a significant proportion of defined
benefit plans exhibit severe backloading. Indeed, backloading is an
inherent property of defined benefit pension plans.
(2) A large fraction of defined benefit plans embed very substantial old age
work disincentives, through an implicit tax on wage earnings.
(3) These pension retirement incentives are often much greater thanSocial
Security's retirement incentives.
(4) Evidence from one large Fortune 500 firm indicates that pension
retirement incentives can greatly increase the extent of early
retirement.
Laurence J. Kotlikoff David A. Wise
Department of Economics Kennedy School of Government
Boston University Harvard University
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I. Introduction
The Federal Government is actively involved in encouraging the
formation and growth of private pensions and in regulating their
behavior. The primary form of encouragement is the government's tax
subsidization of pensions. Workers are not taxed on their pension
benefits when they accrue, but rather when they are received, at which
time their tax brackets may be much lower. In addition, pension saving
accumulates tax-free interest. The primary form of pension regulation is
through ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The
government's involvement in encouraging and regulating private pensions
appears to reflect its desire that workers have a secure source of old
age income which will lessen their reliance on Social Security. In
recent years the government has reacted to demographic changes, and their
effects on Social Security funding, and the increase in early retirement
by also using its pension and Social Security tax and regulatory policies
to encourage workers to delay their retirement decision. What appears to
have received limited recognition is the extent of recent declines in the
labor force participation of older workers, and that while the proposed
increase in the Social Security retirement age is introduced to prolong
work, the provisions of private pension plans encourage early retirement.
This paper examines the structure of pension plans with two
questions in mind. First have government pension backloading regulations
aimed at securing workers' their future pension benefits been effective?
and, second, has the structure of old age pension accrual at the end of
the workspan greatly limited the effectiveness of government policy in4
reversing the trend to early retirement? The answers to these questions
are important for assessing the effects of the government's tax
subsidization of pensions, as they are currently structured.
A.Government Concern with Pension Backloading and the Labor Supply of
the Aged
Over the past two decades the government has been concerned with the
backloading (delaying) of the accrual of vested pension benefits.
Limiting the backloading of pension benefit accrual is an important
objective of ERISA, the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as
well as subsequent legislation. The government's main concern with
pension backloading, reflected in ERISA's vesting and minimum benefit
accrual requirements, appears to be to insure that older workers are not
terminated, either intentionally or unintentionally, just in advance of
accruing significant pension benefits. Senator Bentsen expressed this
concern in introducing ERISA to Congress: "There are instances where
workers have not received pension benefits that they have earned through
years of long hard labor. Their dreams of financial security after
retirement have been shattered." Although the legislation appears
intended to limit the extent of backloading in defined benefit pension
plans, it seems not to recognize that backloading is inherent in the
benefit formulae of most defined benefit plans; it cannot be legislated
away.
Another reason for concern about excessive pension backloading and,
more generally, the pattern of pension benefit accrual, involves
retirement incentives. If most pension benefits accrue before a5
particular age, say the age of early retirement, beyond which additional
accrual is negligible, or possibly negative, workers will have an
incentive to remain with the firm up to early retirement1 and then leave
the firm. In effect, pension provisions often impose a tax on earnings
after a particular age; wage earnings are offset by loss in pension
wealth. This implicit tax could thus be a major explanation of the trend
toward early retirement, a trend that the government is seeking to
reverse through planned increases in the age at which Social Security
benefits are received.
Although the backers of the ERISA legislation were apparently
prompted by the potential avoidance of pension liabilities through
layoff, backloading of pension accrual has much more general implications
for worker mobility. Job change, by itself, reduces pension benefits.
Even if it involves no change in future wage earnings and even if the
provisions of the pension plans on the old and the new jobs are the same,
workers who change jobs will typically have much lower pension benefits
at retirement age than those who remain with the same employer. Thus
pension provisions may inhibit worker mobility, and therefore, adjustment
to changing economic circumstances.
The 1980s have witnessed a marked shift in government policy toward
promoting the labor supply of the elderly. The government has virtually
eliminated mandatory retirement, and scheduled a gradual increase in
Social Security's retirement age. It has limited somewhat Social
Security's earnings test that reduces Social Security benefits for
"retired" workers earning more than an "exempt amount"; it has eliminated6
the earnings test after age 70, and is increasing the actuarial incentive
to delay the receipt of Social Security benefits beyond age 65. The
government has also required that pension plans provide continued pension
benefit accrual for workers who remain with the firm beyond the pension
plan's normal retirement age.
R. Demographic Change Meets the Trend Toward Early Retirement
The change in government policy toward the labor supply of the
elderly is responsive to the major demographic swing currently underway,
with its important implications for retirement finances in the next
century. The elderly (those over 64), who now constitute about one-fifth
of all adults, will constitute about two-fifths of all adults by 2040.
Given Social Security's pay-as-you-go method of finance, the projected
increase in the ratio of beneficiaries to contributors means either
significant cuts in future benefits or significant future increases in
Social Security's payroll tax rate. While the 1983 Social Security
legislation provides a plan for dealing with the baby boomer's
demographic bulge, there is real concern that the plan will not be fully
implemented; and if it is fully implemented, there is concern that it
will not be sufficient.
Reversing the trend toward early retirement represents an important
alternative for addressing the demographic transition. Additional labor
supply of the elderly would relieve Social Security's finances as well as
offset a potential shortage in the supply of labor relative to that of
other productive factors. Despite recent changes in government policy,7
the early retirement trend remains quite strong. Table 1 presents the
labor force participation rates of men between the ages 40 to 64 since
1967. In 1967 the labor force participation rate of men age 55 to 59 was
90.1 percent; it was 81.9 percent in 1980 and 79.0 percent in 1986. For
males 60 to 64 the 1986 labor force participation rate was 54.9 percent,
down from 61.0 percent in 1980 and 77.6 percent in 1967. The
participation rate of men over 65 fell from 35 percent in 1960 to below
20 percent in 1980 (figures not shown in the table).
C.Are Pension Plans the Major Old Age Work Deterrent?
While economists have pointed to Social Security as well as general
increases in living standards as the key explanations for increased early
retirement, there has been little attention given to the retirement
incentives associated with private pension plan provisions. Our analysis
of a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics cross section survey of pension
plans indicates a large proportion with substantially backloaded pension
plans; these plans typically have very sizable accrual as the age of
either early or normal retirement approaches and often have more lower,
or even negative pension accrual, thereafter. Such accrual profiles
engender very large implicit taxes on labor supply beyond the age at
which the significant pension accrual occurs. These old age pension work
disincentives often exceed those arising from the effect of Social
Security provisions on Social Security accrual, and from the effect of
the Social Security earnings test. In addition to fostering early
retirement, such accrual profiles raise the concern, voiced by Senator8
Table 1.Labor Force Participation Rates:




40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
1967 97.0 96.2 94.2 90.1 77.6
1968 97.0 95.9 93.9 90.0 77.3
1969 96.7 95.7 93.5 89.6 75.8
1970 96.5 95.4 93.1 89.5 75.0
1971 96.3 94.9 92.8 88.8 74.1
1972 96.2 94.6 91.9 87.4 72.5
1973 95.8 94.3 91.7 86.2 69.1
1974 95.5 94.0 90.4 85.7 67.9
1975 95.2 94.1 90.1 84.4 65.7
1976 95.0 93.3 89.9 83.6 63.7
1977 95.3 93.2 89.2 83.2 62.9
1978 95.1 93.0 89.7 82.9 62.0
1979 95.3 93.4 89.6 82.2 61.8
1980 95.1 93.3 89.3 81.9 61.0
1981 94.9 93.4 89.6 81.3 58.7
1982 94.7 92.8 89.7 81.9 57.2
1983 94.8 93.3 89.1 80.7 57,0
1984 95.1 93.3 88.9 80.2 56.1
1985 94.7 93.3 88.6 79.6 55.6
1986 94.3 92.9 88.9 79.0 54.9
Source: Employment and Earnings, various years.9
Bensten, that workers may be terminated, or change jobs for other
reasons, immediately prior to accruing the great majority of their
pension benefits.
D. Organization of the Paper
Before presenting the new evidence on pension backloading practices,
we briefly discuss in the next Section a possible economic rationale for
pension backloading as well as the potential economic problems arising
from the government's regulation of the pattern of pension accrual and,
more generally, its anti-age discrimination policy.
Section III introduces the concept of pension accrual and
demonstrates how in many instances it imposes an implicit tax on wage
earnings; sometimes it increases total compensation, other times it
reduces it. Illustrative graphs indicate that defined benefit pension
plans are typically severely backloaded. Section IV discusses ERISA's
anti-backloading rules and suggests why they are ineffective in limiting
backloading. Section V presents findings on the accrual of pension
benefits based on the 1979 Bureau of Labor Statistics Level of Benefits
Survey (BLS-LOB). This survey of 1469 establishments with 3,386,121
pension participants, provides extremely detailed information concerning
vesting, early and normal retirement benefits, supplemental early
retirement benefits, and Social Security offset formulae, each of which
are crucial inputs to the calculation of pension accruals.
Section VI examines the retirement response of workers in a large
Fortune 500 company to the pattern of pension accrual. The pension10
accrual profile for this firm exhibits very substantial backloading with
disproportionate benefit accrual at the age of early retirement and only
modest accrual thereafter. This pension accrual profile appears to
substantially increase the early retirement of the firm's employees. We
estimate that the firm's accrual profile increases from 14 percent to 44
percent the probability that a worker age 55 will leave employment prior
to age 60. The last Section of the paper briefly summarizes our findings
and raises some questions relevant to pension policy.
II. An Economic Rationale for Pension Backloading
In recent years the traditional spot market view of the labor
market, in which compensation equals productivity at each point in time,
has given way to a contract view. According to the contract view,
workers and firms enter into long term relationships, that may be
explicit or implicit, in which there is a relationship over time between
compensation and productivity, but not necessarily an equality between
the two at any given point in time.
The economic rationale for long term labor contracts as opposed to
short term spot market arrangements is that firms can structure
compensation over the workspan to improve worker incentives. For
example, by paying workers less than they produce when young and more
than they produce when old, the firm provides the worker with an enhanced
incentive to remain with the firm. It may also provide an incentive to
work harder; the cost of shirking becomes not only the loss of one's
current salary, but also the lost opportunity to earn more than one11
produces in the future. This carrot-stick age-related structure of
compensation is not only potentially beneficial to employers, but to
workers as well. By reducing worker turnover and increasing effort, the
firm can afford to pay workers a higher present value of compensation.
Such higher present value payments to workers do not reflect the
benevolence of employers, but instead the outcome of a competitive
contract market in which firms compete with each other in hiring
workers.
While the long term contract view of labor arrangements implies that
the firm will compensate the worker in excess of his or her productivity
after an initial period in which the reverse is true, the length of time
during which compensation exceeds productivity cannot be unlimited. The
firm's competitive interest is in reimbursing the worker when old for
earning less than he or she produced when young. But not in paying the
worker more than is necessary to balance the account. Hence, the firm's
interest is in fixing the length of time in which compensation exceeds
productivity. As pointed out by Lazear (1979), mandatory retirement
provides a convenient mechanism for limiting this time period.
Compensation can be paid as wage earnings or as pension accrual.
Therefore, one mechanism for paying deferred compensation at certain
ages, and for reducing compensation at subsequent ages, is to provide
significant positive pension accrual prior to a critical age, and small
or even negative pension accrual thereafter.
In eliminating mandatory retirement the government may have reduced
one important mechanism by which employers were able to limit the amount12
of deferred compensation. If Congress were also to proscribe abrupt
changes in the age-profile of pension or any other form of compensation,
firms might find it even more difficult to structure deferred
compensation efficiently.
In addition to potential assistance in providing work incentives,
the age-profile of pension accrual may represent a graceful mechanism to
lower the wages of older workers if, as seems likely (see Kotlikoff,
1987), they become less productive with age. As described below, pension
accrual after early and/or normal retirement ages is often quite small,
if not negative.
III. Pension Benefit Accrual Formulae and Implicit Tax on Wage Earnings
Vested pension benefit accrual at age a, 1(a), equals the difference
between pension wealth at age a+l, Pw(a+l), and pension wealth at age a,
Pw(a), accumulated to age a+l at the nominal interest rate r, i.e.,
(1) 1(a) =Pw(a+l)—Pw(a)(1+r)
Pension accrual is thus the increment to pension wealth in excess of the
return on the previously accumulated pension bank account. Pension
wealth at age a is defined as the expected value of vested pension
benefits discounted to age a. The term "expected" refers to the use of
mortality probabilities to assess the chances that the worker will be
alive at future ages when benefits are available. Intuitively, Pw(a) can
be thought of as the worker's pension bank account. If 1(a) equals zero,
the worker continuing employment with the plan sponsor at age a has13
exactly the same pension wealth at age (a+l) as an identically situated
worker who terminates employment at age a. He receives no compensation
in the form of increased future pension benefits.
Figure 1 presents the age-profile of accrued pension benefits
divided by wages for a hypothetical plan under different assumptions
about real wage growth and nominal interest rates. The top profile, for
example, is based on a 3 percent rate of real wage growth and a 9 percent
nominal interest rate. The inflation rate assumed in each profile is 6
percent. The plan provides 100 percent vesting at ten years of service
and calculates normal retirement benefits as 1 percent of average
earnings over the last 5 years of service times the number of years of
service. The plan's early and normal retirement ages are 55 and 65,
respectively. Workers can retire early and receive early retirement
benefits which equal normal retirement benefits reduced by 3 percent for
each year that retirement precedes the normal retirement age.
There are two significant discontinuities in the profiles. One
occurs at age 40 when the worker becomes vested; clearly in going from
age 39 to age 40 the worker's vested pension wealth changes abruptly from
zero to a positive number explaining the jump in the profile. The second
discontinuity occurs at the age of early retirement. It arises because
the 3 percent per year early retirement reduction factor is much more
generous than an actuarial reduction. By retiring a year earlier, the
worker gains a year's benefit with only a modest, 3 percent, payment for
that delay. To understand more clearly why there is a discontinuous fall






































































































































































































































































































































































early retirement reduction factor is zero. In this case by working an
additional year after age 55 the worker loses that year's benefit
entirely. While it is true that his (her) future benefit will likely be
larger because of an additional year of service and possibly an increase
in the earnings base, the loss of this year's benefit may significantly
offset or even outweigh, in present value, this benefit increase,
implying a small or negative pension accrual during the period after
earlyretirement.
The diagram indicates roughly a halving in the accrual ratio between
ages55 and 56. Beyond age 55 the accrual ratio declines gradually. If
one assumes a sufficiently high interest rate, the accrual after age 55
is negative. According to the three curves, total compensation is
roughly 8 percent lower, ceteris paribus, at age 65 than at age 55. The
diagram also indicates that much of the accrual of vested pension
benefits occurs in the ages immediately preceding age 55. Figure 2 shows
the effect of the lower than actuarial reduction for early retirement on
the hypothetical plan's accrual profile. It compares the top profile of
Figure 1 with the profile that would occur if the reduction factor were
actuarial, or, what is equivalent, if workers were forced to wait until
the normal retirement age to collect benefits. Notice that the
discontinuity at age 65 disappears. Also note that the backloading in
the "Retirement at 65 Only" profile is even greater than that in the
profile with the early retirement option. This is inherent in the
defined benefit formula, with the benefit at age a typically given by


































































































































































































































































































service at age (a), and k is a multiplier often between .01 and .02. If
k=.02, the worker's benefit, in nominal dollars, is 2 percent of his
final wage for each year of service; after working 30 years, the pension
would equal 60 percent of the final wage.
A. The Accrual Profile for a Large Fortune 500 Firm
The profiles presented in the first two diagrams, while indicative
of a considerable degree of backloading, are based on a hypothetical plan
with rather simple features. But if one thing is true of private pension
plans it is that there is enormous variation among them. Figure 3
presents the pension accrual profile of male managers hired at age 20 in
the Fortune 500 firm whose retirement behavior is discussed in Section
VI. The diagram also includes the estimated age-wag profile in absolute
1985 dollars for the managers as well as the age-accrual profile of
Social Security benefits.
In addition to having ten year "cliff" vesting, a two step
earnings-related normal retirement benefit formula, this plan has a
Social Security offset, a supplemental early retirement benefit, and
special early retirement benefit reduction factors. The supplemental
early retirement benefit and the less than actuarially fair reduction
factors are available only to workers who remain with the firm through
age 55, the early retirement age. Workers who leave at age 54 or earlier
can start collecting their vested benefits at age 55, but these benefits
are actuarially reduced. In addition, such pre-early retirement



















































































































































































































































































































Security offset. In contrast, for workers retiring at age 55 or later,
the Social Security offset does not occur until age 65; hence, the
supplemental early retirement benefit corresponds to the Social Security
offset for each year between the age of retirement and age 65.
Thus there are two important reasons for the accrual spike at early
retirement in figure 3. The first is the non-actuarial early retirement
reduction factors, and the fact that they are available only to those
remaining with the firm until age 55; the second is the delay in the
Social Security offset which is also only provided to workers remaining
through early retirement.
Now that we understand the source of the large accrual spike in
figure 3, let us consider its size and implications. First the spike at
age 55 is very large -- overone and one half times a year's earnings.
Second, between age 55 and 60, accrual, while small in comparison with
the spike at 55, is still quite important. However, after age 60 accrual
is negative, becoming significantly negative by age 65. Clearly, this is
an extremely backloaded pension plan that provides workers with a strong
incentive to remain with the firm through early retirement and a strong
incentive to leave the firm thereafter. For workers who quit or
otherwise lose their jobs at, for example, age 54, there is a very
substantial loss in benefits compared with remaining on the job through
age 55. In its effect accrual profiles of this kind recreate the
situation of some plans prior to ERISA in which workers could be
terminated immediately before they accrued the bulk of their potential20
pension benefits. There is clear evidence that this does not happen in
this firm, however.
IV. How Firms May Circumvent ERISA's Anti-Backloading Rules
ERISA stipulates that defined benefit pension accrual must satisfy
one of three provisions. The first is a 3 percent rule that says that a
worker's accrued benefit must exceed his years of service times 3 percent
of the normal retirement benefit he would have if he had begun service at
the earliest possible age of participation and had remained with the firm
until normal retirement. That is, for each year of employment pension
accrual must be at least 3 percent of the amount the worker will have if
he stays until normal retirement. The second is a 133 percent rule that
says that future projected annual pension accrual cannot exceed 133
percent of current annual pension accrual. The third provision
stipulates that the terminating worker's benefit be not less than his
projected normal retirement benefit times the ratio of actual completed
service to the service the worker would have if he remained with the firm
through early retirement. That is, if the worker leaves after 20 years
and normal retirement would be after 40 years, his benefit must be 50
percent of what he would have if he worked 20 more years.
Each of these three provisions specifies that the projection of
future normal retirement benefits and future pension accrual be
determined by assuming that a worker's future wage equals his current
wage. But if there is wage inflation future wages may be much greater
than current wages, and the real value of current accrual may be quite21
low. Thus even a modest rate of wage inflation could permit a quite
backloaded plan that, nonetheless, meets one of the three
anti-backloading provisions. The choice of other assumptions in the
accrual calculation, such as the interest rate, also give firms
additional latitude in deferring pension accrual.
However, the main method of backloading that does not appear to be
ruled out by the three ERISA rules, involves early retirement
provisions. The accrual rules pertain to normal retirement benefits,
rather than early retirement benefits. Extra benefits arising from
supplemental early retirement benefits or from less than actuarial
reductions of early retirement benefits do not appear to be considered in
the three anti-backloading rules. Thus a firm could structure its plan
to have small normal retirement benefit, but to have substantial early
retirement benefit, for example. It could easily conform its accrual of
the small normal retirement benefit to one of the three ERISA rules, but
yet remain free to specify quite large early retirement benefits which
only accrue if the worker stays with the firm through a critical age.
Recall the example of the large firm considered here; this firm provides
extra early retirement benefits in the form of (1) a waiver until the age
of normal retirement in their offset of benefits due to Social Security
and (2) less than actuarial early retirement reduction rates.
V. Pension Accrual in the BLS-LOB Data
In this section we examine accrual ratios for earnings-based defined
benefit plans from the BLS-LOB survey. Earnings based plans account for22
approximately 80 percent of BLS-designated usable plans from the survey
and about 65 percent of plans weighted by pension coverage. Each of the
earnings-based plans we examine stipulates cliff-vesting at 10 years, but
the plans have different normal and early retirement ages. Other
earnings-based plans with different vesting ages have accrual profiles
similar to those that we shall describe, but for convenience of
exposition we have not included them in our analysis here. Of the 1,183
earnings-based plans we examine, 508 are integrated with social security
under an offset formula. The accrual profiles were calculated assuming a
6 percent nominal wage growth up to age 65, after which nominal wage
growth is assumed to be zero. We also assume a 9 percent interest rate.
Our calculations are based on the industry-occupation-age-earnings
profiles reported in Kotlikoff and Wise (1987).
A. The Decline in Pension Wealth Accrual at Early and Normal Retirement
Ages
Age profiles o,f the average ratio of pension accrual to the wage for
the percent of earnings plans with 10-year cliff vesting are shown in
table 2 by early and normal retirement ages. Three of these average
profiles, corresponding to plans with the respective early and normal
retirement ages --55-55,55-65, 65-65 --,aregraphed in figure 4. The
55-55 and the 65-65 profiles show a considerable degree of backloading,
the first with disproportionate accrual as age approaches 55, and the
second as age approaches 65. In addition, each of the graphs show very
substantial declines in the rate of pension wealth accrual at several
critical ages. The first is the age of normal retirement, which equals23
the age of early retirement for plans with no early retirement option.
Second, there is a sharp decline in the rate of accrual at the age of
early retirement, but this decline is substantially lower than the
decline at the normal retirement age. Third, there is a very substantial
decline between ages 65 and 66 in the average accrual rate no matter what
the ages of early and normal retirement. This age 65 decline would,
however, be smaller under current law which mandates continued
participation in the plan's benefit formula after the plan's normal
retirement age. This 1986 legislation was not incorporated in these
accrual analyses because the law postdates our information on the pension
plans. The new law may have temporarily altered the post normal
retirement accrual pattern. But, if the patterns depicted here were
chosen for a specific reason, and there is little evidence that they were
or that they were not, plans could add additional features that will
restore the pre-1986 decline in pension accrual after normal retirement.
The declines in average accrual rates at the critical ages indicated
in table 2 are highlighted in table 3. The ages of early and normal
retirement are identical in columns 1, 4, 6, and 8 of the table with
respective retirement ages of 55, 60, 62, and 65. At these ages the
accrual rate as a percent of wages declines from .26 to 0, .27 to —.06,
.25 to —.13, and .21 to —.19 respectively. Thus, total annual
compensation (wage plus pension accrual) from working declines at these
ages by 21 percent, 26 percent, 30 percent, and 33 percent respectively.
Surely the incentive beyond these ages to continue work with the current
employer is very substantially reduced.24
Table 2. Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans With





























































- .012 .111 .072
- .020 .118 .076
- .028 .129 .077
- .038 .143 .079
- .048 -.090 .068
- .058- .091 .064
- .067- .091 .056
- .076- .092 .053
-.085 -.094 .044
- .292- .169- .152
- .294- .174- .162
- .295- .179- .171
- .296- .182- .179




























































































































































a. Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.25
Table 3.
Age
Early and Normal Retirement Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
55 55 55 60 60 62 62 65



















-.085 -.094.044 -.121 .112 -.144 .006 .211
-.292-.169 -.152 -.138-.088-.266-.081 -.194
-.297-.184 -.186 -.196-.182-.255-.077-.234
20 8 19 2 20 12 8 4026
In instances where early and normal retirement ages do not coincide,
there is also a very substantial decline in the average ratio of pension
accrual to the wage at the age of normal retirement. For example, among
plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 60 the average
decline is from .14 to —.09. There is also a decline at the age of early
retirement for these plans, although it is considerably less than the
decline at the age of normal retirement. For example, of plans with
.-.-.__._.- .-.-:c: __-i .... LIZ .—t. LeLLL11LLIL L J.) LiLJLL1IL LLLL1JLLLL L U.) LLI dveLd.,e U.eLLILIe d.L.
55is from .10 to .07, while at 65 the average decline is from .04 to
—.15.
The figure and the table also show a large variation in average
pension accrual at 40, the age of cliff vesting. It is highest, on
average, for plans with early and normal retirement at 55 and lowest, on
average, for plans with early and normal retirement at 65. As mentioned,
because the early retirement reduction is typically less than actuarially
fair, pension wealth -- thepresent value of the future stream of benefit
payments -- isgenerally greatest if benefits are taken at the age of
early retirement. Thus the accrued wealth at the age of vesting is
usually calculated by discounting benefits from the age of early
retirement, assuming that the worker could begin to collect benefits at
that age. Figure 4, for example, shows an average vesting spike of
almost 25 percent of earnings for 55-55 plans, 7 percent of earnings for
55-65 plans, and about 4 percent of earnings for 65-65 plans.27
B.Variation Among Plans
Even among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages
there is wide variation in accrual rates at each age, particularly after
the age of early retirement. Consider the accrual ratio at age 55.
While the average ratio for this subsample is .097, the maximum is .405,
and the minimum is 0. The ratio at the lowest fifth percentile is 0,
while it is .208 for the highest fifth percentile. There is a similarly
1..___ .. ... ___.1._ I.f\ -L.___L LL ,eLipet LULLLid1LLLLUdLdULLUdi LdLLOS dL dLLL Ut LLL d,eS '-fU LLIL UU,LL
70.Weighted average accrual rates together with upper and lower 5
percentile levels are graphed in figure 5. While the average accrual
rates between ages 55 and 65 are positive, for many plans the rates prior
to age 65 are very negative. Thus it is very important not to base
judgments about the labor force participation incentive effects of
pensions simply on the basis of average accrual rates.
Additional evidence of the variability of pension accrual profiles
and the possibility of severely backloaded plans is obtained by comparing
profiles of particular plans. Figure 6 plots the accrual profiles of
four of the sample's largest plans. Plan 1 exhibits a 29 percent vesting
spike, a reduction of 30 percentage points in the accrual ratio at age 55
and a further major reduction at age 65 from —.063 to —.351. In contrast
the vesting spike is only 4 percent for plan 2 in the figure. This plan
also exhibits no major reduction in the accrual ratio after early
retirement and only a minor reduction at normal retirement. Plan 3's
vesting spike is much less than that of plan 1, but the drop in accrual




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































exhibits extremely sharp changes in accrual ratios at ages 60, and 63.
Plan 4 exhibits even greater discontinuities in the accrual profile and
more backloading then plan 3.It shows little accrual before age 55,
accrual at 55 equivalent to about 75 percent of the wage, little accrual
at ages 56 through 59, accrual at 60 almost twice as large as wage
earnings, then negative accrual at ages 61 through 63 equivalent to about
50 percent of the wage. Clearly, the plans' incentive effects on labor
force participation also vary widely.
C.Accrual Ratios by Industry and Occupation
Holding fixed the early and normal retirement age, there is little
difference in average accrual profiles across industries or occupations.
But since these retirement ages differ, on average, particularly across
industries, a typical worker faces a much greater incentive to leave the
labor force early in some industries than in others. For example, a
large proportion of workers covered by pensions in transportation would
experience a 27 percent reduction in effective compensation by continuing
to work between 55 and 56. While at 55, pension accrual would be
equivalent to about 27 percent of wage rates for many workers in this
industry, if the worker continued in the labor force until age 66, his
annual loss in pension wealth would be equivalent to 30 percent of wage
earnings at 66. A large proportion of workers in manufacturing have
plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65. In this
case, the accrual at 55 averages about 9 percent of the wage at 55 and
only declines to about 7 percent of the wage by 65. But then the accrual32
rate becomes negative, and if the worker were to continued in the labor
force between 65 and 66, the decline in pension accrual would amount to
an effective reduction in compensation of about 21 percent.
D.The Possible Impact of the 1986 Age Discrimination Act on Pension
Accrual
Table 4 isolates the potential impact of the 1986 legislation
requiring continued participation in the pension formula after the planes
normal retirement age. The table presents the accrual ratios for percent
of earnings plans with early retirement at 55 and selected normal
retirement ages calculated first assuming that all of the plans had a
provision to credit fully post normal retirement service and second,
assuming that all the plans had no such credit provision. The table
indicates that the effect of crediting service after normal retirement
depends importantly on the age of normal retirement. For plans with a
normal retirement age of 55, negative accrual ratios are larger in
absolute value under no crediting prior to age 66 and smaller in absolute
value thereafter. A similar pattern, although less pronounced, is
observed after age 62 for plans with normal reitrernent at that age. The
least effect is found for the most common plans, those with normal
retirement at 65 (and early retirement at 55). If pension plans do not
alter some other features to reproduce the pre-1986 retirement
incentives, the 1986 legislation will have a nontrivial affect on
retirement incentives for some plans at some ages. But even if plans are
not restructured, fully crediting post normal retirement service has only33
Table 4. Weighted average accrual rates for percent of earnings plans with
10-year cliff vesting and early retirement at 55, by normal retirement age,
assuming full credit and no credit post retirement provisions.






































































































































































































































a very minor impact on accrual after age 66 for the great majority of
pension plans.
E. Early and Normal Retirement Supplements and the Potential for
Backloading
Approximately 11.4 percent of plans have early, and 7.5 have normal
retirement supplements. The typical normal retirement supplement
A-..-. ..._-.4--.--.--. .-..-.1.-...1 .-..i-.-.A c4-i-..-.
1.. I.) V LLtCLL a.n.ns LL.JtLLI.)LI LLICL W..LC_a1_t..usaLcI.sLICLLCL. .1. LflSI LL1C .LSL'.JL.V.L,aLLaj_
postponesretirement until the normal retirement age. The typical early
retirement supplement provides an addition to benefits if retirement
occurs after the age of early retirement. Retirement supplements, which
are not available to workers who leave prior to reaching specified ages,
thus provide a potentially powerful mechanism for pension backloading.
The average accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat plans
with supplements, with 10-year cliff vesting, and with early and normal
retirement at 55 and 65 respectively, are shown in table 5 by type of
supplement. There are just two plans in the category with only normal
retirement supplements, but, nonetheless, the effect of the supplements
cn be seen in the first column of the table. The accrual rate jumps
from about 8 percent of the wage at age 64 to 60 percent of the wage at
age 65. Thus the supplement generates substantial backloading and
provides a relatively strong incentive to remain with the firm until age
65, but thereafter there is a sharp drop in the accrual rate to —18
percent.
Accrual rates for plans with early retirement supplements are shown
in the second column of the table. In this case there is a sharp35
Table 5. Weighted average accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat
plans with 10-year cliff vesting, early and normal retirement at 5.5-65,
and early or normal retirement supplement, by type of supplement.
Tvoe ofSuon1cmnt
Normal Early Both
No. of Plans 2 10 10
Age




42 .013 .023 .011
43 .015 .026 .013
44 .017 .031 .018
45 .019 .035 .023
46 .022 .040 .030
47 .025 .047 .037
48 .028 .053 .044
49 .032 .060 .052
50 .036 .069 .060
51 .040 .079 .070
52 .045 .094 .081
53 .051 .106 .095





56 .047 .0007 :051
-
57 .051 -.008 -.049
58 .054 -.014 -.043
59 .058 -.022 -.046
60 .061 -.011 -.051
61 .066 -.049 -.068
62 .070 -.058 -.072





65 .601 -.031 .008
66 -.181 -.247 092
67 -.180 -.213 -.167
68 -.179 -.207 -.164
69 -.179 -.204 -.163
70 -.178 -.201 -. 16036
increase in the average accrual rate from 12 percent of the wage at age
54 to 44 percent at age 55, with a sharp drop thereafter. Again, the
provision increases backloading and provides a substantial incentive to
remain with the firm until the age of early retirement, with a very
substantial disincentive to remaining thereafter. Accrual rates for
plans with both types of supplement are shown in the last column of the
table. In this case there is a rather large spike at the age of early
retirement, equal to 62 percent of the wage in that year, with a smaller,
but still noticeable spike at about the age of normal retirement.
Accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat plans with either
type of supplement are shown in table 6 for selected early and normal
retirement ages. The spikes in the accrual rates are highlighted with
dashed lines. Consider, for example, plans with early retirement at age
55. The spike created by the early retirement supplement is from .22 at
age 54 to .39 at age 55 for plans with normal retirement at 55, from .12
at age 54 to .50 at age 55 for plans with normal retirement at 60, and
from .11 at age 54 to .48 at age 55 for plans with normal retirement at
65. Of the 56 plans with normal retirement at age 60, the pension
accrual rate at that age is, on average, equivalent to 100 percent of the
wage rate.
Similar discontinuities in the accrual ratios are evident for plans
with other early and normal retirement ages. For example, of plans with
early and normal retirement at age 60, the accrual rate at that age is
equivalent to 64 percent of the annual wage for persons aged 60. Thus
these special supplements create very significant one-time additions to37
Table 6. Weighted average accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat
plans with 10-year cliff vesting and early or normal retirement




































































-.093 - .301 - .056
-.108 - .353 - .067




-. 124 - .088
-
=. 182
-. 141 - . 116 - . 195
-. 150 - . 124 - . 191
-.151 - .132 - .188






























































































a. There are no plans in the 62-65 or in the 65-65 early-normal retirement
groups.38
pension wealth and, therefore, provide very important incentives to
remain with the firm until the age that the special supplement is
awarded. The special supplements also further dramatize the wide
variation in the incentive effects implicit in the provisions of private
pension plans.
VI. Pension Accrual and Retirement in a Large Firm
This section considers the relationship between pension accrual and
retirement in the Fortune 500 firm whose plan is described in section
III. The data are the employment and earnings histories between 1969 and
1984 of all workers who were employed by the firm in any of years between
1980 and 1984. There are five sex-occupation groups: male and female
office workers, male and female salesworkers, and male managers. The
provisions of the firm pension plan are such that different workers face
very different pension accrual profiles and, thus, pension compensation.
As a consequence, different workers face very different incentives for
continued work versus retirement.
To illustrate these provisions, pension accruals and predicted wages
(see Kotlikoff and Wise, 1987) for managers with different birth and hire
years are shown in tables 7 and 8, respectively. Those born in 1940
reach age 55 in 1995, and for each of these groups there is a
discontinuous increase in pension wealth in that year. It is $29,639 for
those with 15 years of service in that year and $82,953 for those with 25
years of service. Comparable jumps occur in 1985 for those born in
1930. Accruals are often negative for persons over 60. The differences39
Table 7. Accrual in Pension Wealth by Year of Birth and Year
of Hire for Managers
Born
Hired
1960 1950 1940 1930
1980 1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980 1975 1970 1960
1980 0 0 0 0 0 508 0 0 835 2686
1981 0 0 0 0 0 380 0 0 562 2059
1982 0 0 0 0 0 770 0 0 1413 3716
1983 0 0 0 0 0 582 0 0 1079 2710
1984 0 0 1278 0 2470 1494 0 2968 3053 6530
1985 0 0 251 0 475 767 018226 2648172527
1986 0 0 663 0 1335 2090 0 5616 822713781
1987 0 0 353 0 651 994 0 2593 3691 4118
1988 0 0 663 0 1289 1978 0 4105 5874 8553
1989 1008 2158 767 4037 1479 232322194 3745 5342 5263
1990 194 388 890 688 1709 2676 831 3280 4726 5382
1991 341 690 1051 1297 2174 3168 1060 1685 2376 -7118
1992 418 845 1260 1601 2675 3820 609 1389 2029 -7356
1993 504 1016 1485 2021 3202 4515 -89 683 1312 -8127
1994 606 1220 1756 2603 3851 5351 -908 -155 419 -8902
1995 716 1441 2043 296394072782953-2067 -1384-3515 -10152
1996 843 1695 2555 7130 9538 9898 5217 3628 -939 -5346
1997 987 1986 2992 7349 967211334 4579 2855 -1652 -6363
1998 1153 2422 3499 7437 964110665 3902 2041-2384-7386
1999 1342 2969 4085 7377 9426 7844 3186 1187 -3129 -8394
2000 1558 3492 3900 7140 6196 8643 2423 -1882 -3874 -9344
2001 1807 4095 4481 4432 2198 -6178 0 0 0 0
2002 2093 4790 5149 3750 1206 -7237 0 0 0 0
2003 2517 5587 5904 2870 -15 -8380 0 0 0 0
2004 3037 6502 6763 1791 4378 -9658 0 0 0 0
2005 291895433 117775 -2553-8981 -11004 0 0 0 0
2006 33611195514674 -1993 -4042 -6843 0 0 0 0
2007 38721370516840 -2784 -4988 -7994 0 0 0 0
2008 44611302215944 -3601 -5955 -9155 0 0 0 0
2009 5139 980911879 -4436-6930 -10299 0 0 0 0
2010 59101092313211 -5265-7875 -11375 0 0 0 0
2011 6792 -6583 -8668 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 7801-7785 -10184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 8940-9069 -11809 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014 10223 -10418 -13531 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015168439 -11848 -15345 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2016 21859-8684 -12662 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2017 25137-9994 -14317 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2018 23904 -11319 -15955 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2019 17968 -12627 -17524 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2020 19964 -13849 -18933 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2021 -12355 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2022 -14649 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023 -17087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024 -19659 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025 -22287 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026 -21570 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2027 -24026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028 -26391 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029 -28576 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0






1975 1970 1960 1950
1980 0 0 1178 5146 7442
1981 0 0 -616 -105 -9132
1982 0 0 451 2175 -5043
1983 0 0 -2739-2721 -13235
1984 0 5090 658 3575 -2995
1985 0 -5357 -5328-8152 -14936
1986 0 0 8151 3728 831
1987 0 0 2108-4957 -10017
1988 0 4176 3987 -1882 -6347
1989 0 5038 2968 -3049 -7920
1990 0 4265 2109 -3889 -8984
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0 0
2018 0 0 0 0 0
2019 0 0 0 0 0
2020 0 0 0 0 0
2021 0 0 0 0 0
2022 0 0 0 0 0
2023 0 0 0 0 0
2024 0 0 0 0 0
2025 0 0 0 0 0
2026 0 0 0 0 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0
2030 0 0 0 0 0
Year41
Table 8. Wage Earnings by Year of Birth and Year
of Hire for Managers
Born
Hired
1960 1950 1940 1930
1980 1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980 1975 1970 1960
1980 204052405333021 27894340204071231825349453866648446
1981 228522608234967 29403353544185332739356663922648813
1982 253122805736807 30819365864289833548 362893969349098
1983 277572996538542 32141377204385834256368194007449300
1984 30615322714077433869393424541035390378184097750156
1985 334793454342948 35535409044691336447 387414180350919





1991 4990447147 54951441874905954987410834251744827 52690





1997 6423057786 65695 50151546156048741988420484280546602
1998 664815938067389 50812551666095441656414034179444615
1999 687176092069047 513535557361236411614057040568 42359
2000 7094662398 70655 5176055816613074049339542 39125 39852
2001 731786381472206 520235587961148 0 0 0 0
2002 754156515173676 521235573960728 0 0 0 0
2003 7766766402 75052 52047 5538160028 0 0 0 0
2004 799316755076307 517795478359027 0 0 0 0
2005 822136858177417 513055393157709 0 0 0 0
2006 845026947178349 506095281056063 0 0 0 0
2007 867967019979069496785141054084 0 0 0 0
2008 8908170739 79543485034972751778 0 0 0 0
2009 9134771067 79735470814776449160 0 0 0 0
2010 9356771151 79604454084552646251 0 0 0 0
2011 957217096579114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 9777470478 78230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 996946966576922 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20141014386850375168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20151029596697472952 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20161042026506270267 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20171051156276667124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20181056386009063546 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20191057125705159572 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20201052775367555254 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2021104279 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2022102671 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023100415 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024 97484 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025 93875 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026 89598 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2027 84690 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028 79209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029 73239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0






1980 35723 35788 365194018647598
1981 36006 35902 364703979446774
1982 36188 35919 363233928045765
1983 36276 35845 360803864244568
1984 36819 36215 362773844643828
1985 37271 36488 363623809242847
1986 37632 36660 363333757441624
1987 37900 36728 361813688540157
1988 38066 36679 358953601438445
1989 38124 36507 354673495636499
1990 38067 36205 348913371334339
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0 0
2018 0 0 0 0 0
2019 0 0 0 0 0
2020 0 0 0 0 0
2021 0 0 0 0 0
2022 0 0 0 0 0
2023 0 0 0 0 0
2024 0 0 0 0 0
2025 0 0 0 0 0
2026 0 0 0 0 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0
2030 0 0 0 0 043
in accruals because of different amounts of service indicated in the
table reflect the fact that the benefit formula and early retirement
reduction factors are service-dependent.
Pension accruals provide a large incentive for some groups to stay
in the firm for another year and strong incentive for others to leave.
For example, staying with the firm in 1985 brings pension accrual of
$72,527 for 55 year old managers with 25 years of service (born in 1930
and hired in 1960), but a loss of $14,936 for 65 year olds with 35 years
of experience (born in 1920 and hired in 1950). Thus there is enormous
variation across older workers in the effective compensation for
continued service. One might expect, therefore, that some groups would
be much more likely than others to retire in a given year.
The pension accrual profiles for other employee groups look very
much like those for male managers. Accrual is minimal during the first
years of service. There is a very substantial discontinuous increase in
pension wealth at age 55. And accrual typically becomes negative after
30 years of service, sometimes before that. Social Security accrual
becomes negative after 65. The major differences among the groups stem
from different age-earnings profiles. An illustration of the similarity
and difference is provided by comparing figure 3, which depicts accrual
profiles for male managers, with figure 7, which depicts profiles for
salesmen.44
A. The Retirement Response to the Pattern of Pension Accrual
Table 9 presents annual departure rates, the proportion of workers
who leave the firm before the end of the year, cross tabulated by age and
years of service. Several aspects of the data stand out. There is
substantial turnover in the first 9 years of employment, especially
during the first five years. On average, about 15 percent of those
employed five years or less leave in a given year. The table shows rates
only for employees 40 and older. The departure rates are somewhat higher
for younger workers, 16 or 17 percent for those employed 5 years or less
and 10 to 12 percent for those employed 6 to 9 years. There is a sharp
decline in departure rates at 10 years of service, when employees are
about to become vested in the pension plan. Before the early retirement
age, 55, the typical decline is from 8 or 9 to 4 or 5 percent. After 55,
when vesting carries with it eligibility for early retirement, it is much
sharper, often from 10 percent or more to 3 percent or less.
The availability of early retirement benefits at 55 apparently has a
substantial effect on retirement. Before 55 departure rates are
typically around 2 percent over a broad spectrum of age-service
combinations. At 55, they jump to 10 percent or more. It is important
to notice that the departure rates stay at that level until age 60, when
there is another jump in the rate of departure. The jump at 60
corresponds to the age at which pension accrual becomes negative for many
employees.
To understand the potential importance of the early retirement















































































































































































































































































































Table 9. Departure Rates, by Age and Years of Service,





Age ￿5 9 10 15 20 23 24 25 26 2728 29 30 31+
40 15 8 5 7 4 3 0

































60 9 9 3 15 12 19 16 17 20 16 20 1519
61 9 7 2 16 17 15 19 12 25 16 2321 24
65 12 3545 57
66 26 17 25 16
67 13 28 18 32













4 2 2 2 0 0
4 4 4 3 2 0 0 0
3 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 0
6 4 3 1 4 2 3 5 0 .5
3 4 4 1 0 5 2 2 0 0
4 3 3 4 4 4 0 4 2 0
4 4 2 5 1 2 4 2 3 2
4 3 5 1 1 1 1 2 0 0
4 3 3 2 2 1 1 3 2 3
3 3 5 2 3 4 2 2 2 5
4 4 2 4 2 4 1 3 6 6
4 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3
4 2 4 2 2 3 1 0 1 3
559 5 4 11 9 11 1310 1311 12 7 9
56 11 6 6 12 11 12 7 8 11 11 12 16 14
8 9 10 8 9 9 314 11
8 12 13 11 13 15 910 13









34 37 34 33 38404234 30
35 37 43 354341 62 3347
33 34 18 32 26 2742 5341
52 54 44 55 57 70 5054 69
16 43 50 16 20 25 38 33 9
17 29 0 1421 0 13 3350
25 11 0 50 0 29 0 0 047
rates would remain at 3 percent until age 60, instead of the 10 or 12
percent rates that are observed. (Notice that the departure rates for
employees aged 55 to 61 who are in their tenth year of service- -not yet
vested and hence not eligible for early retirement benefits- -are also two
or three percent on average.) Departure at 3 percent per year would mean
that 14 percent of those who were employed at 55 would have left before
age 60. At a departure rate of 11 percent per year, 44 percent would
leave between 55 and 59. Such a difference, even if only for a small
proportion of all firms, can have a very substantial effect on aggregate
labor force participation rates.
The jump in departure rates at 60, especially noticeable for persons
with 25 or more years of service, was mentioned just above. There is
another sharp increase in departure rates at 62 when Social Security
benefits are first available. The increase at 62 is also noticeable for
employees with less than ten years of service and not yet vested in the
firm's pension plan. They can take Social Security benefits, of course.
Finally, there is a very sharp increase in the departure rate at age
65. For many workers the total reward for working after age 65 is close
to zero, due to negative pension and Social Security accruals. It is
important to keep in mind that the large departure rates before 65 mean
that most employees have left well before that age. Thus high annual
departure rates at 65 indicate only that a large proportion of the few
that continue work until 65 retire then. This point is highlighted in
table 10 below that presents the cumulative fraction remaining with the
firm from age 50 to each specified age.48
Note first that departure rates of employees who have been in the
firm for only 8 to 10 years, and are not yet vested, are very low at
every age, as emphasized above. And again, the increase in the departure
rates at 55, 60, 62, and 65 stands out. Based on the 1981 and 1983
departure rates, only 48 percent of those employed at 50 would still be
employed at 60, and then 17 percent of these would leave. Only 10
percent would remain until age 65 and then about 50 percent of these
would leave.
The data also show the effect of a special early retirement
incentive that was in effect in 1982 only. The incentive program
provided a bonus to employees who were eligible for early retirement in
1982; that is, those who were vested and were 55 years old or older. The
bonus was equivalent to three months salary for 55 year old employees and
increased to 12 months salary for 60 year olds. At age 65, the bonus was
12 months salary for employees with 20 or fewer years of service and
declined to 6 months salary for those with 30 to 39 years of service.
It is clear that the effect of the incentive was large. The
departure rates for 1981 and for 1983 are virtually identical. But the
rates were much higher in 1982. For example, the departure rate for 60
year olds was 17 percent in 1981 and in 1983, but 32 percent in 1982.
For those age 63, the departure rate was 37 percent in 1981 and in 1983,
but 54 percent in 1982. Of those employed at age 50, 40 percent would
still have been employed after age 60 based on the 1981 and 1983
departure rates. Only 27 percent would remain after age 60 based on the
1982 rates.49
Table 10. Cumulative and Yearly Departure Rates by Calendar




8-10 YOS 11+ YOS 11+ YOS
Age 1980 198119821983 1981 1982 1983
50 7 97 97 97
51 9 3 94 94 94
52 3 5 5 89 89 89
53 0 4 4 85 86 86
54 4 3 4 2 83 83 84
55 5 11 12 10 74 73 75
56 4 12 14 10 66 63 68
57 2 9 12 11 60 56 61
58 5 10 14 12 54 48 54
59 2 11 20 10 48 38 48
60 4 17 29 17 40 27 40
61 0 17 32 18 33 18 33
62 8 36 48 31 21 10 23
63 14 37 54 37 13 5 14
64 29 49 26 10 2 11
65 58 45 5 1 6
6650
A great deal of effort has been devoted to estimating the effect of
Social Security provisions on labor force participation. In particular,
Hausman and Wise [1985], Burtless [1986], and Boskin and Hurd [1984] have
attempted to estimate the effect on labor force participation of the
increases in Social Security benefits during the early l970s. It would
appear from the results here that the effects of these across the board
increases in Social Security benefits are likely to be small relative to
the effects of the private pension provisions. For example, it seems
clear that shifting the age of early retirement in the firm plan from 55
to 60 would have a very dramatic effect on departure rates. Leaving the
early retirement age at 55, but eliminating negative pension and Social
Security accruals, thereafter, would apparently also have a substantial
effect on retirement rates.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
Most defined benefit plans are strongly backloaded, notwithstanding
ERISA legislation aimed at limiting it. For a sizable fraction of
defined benefit plans, the special shape of pension accrual profiles
produce significant incentives to remain with one's current employer
prior to at least early retirement. After the age of normal retirement,
and, often, early retirement, pension accrual profiles typically provide
substantial incentives to leave employment. They impose a large implicit
tax on employment. These retirement incentives appear large when
compared, for example, with the retirement incentives arising under
Social Security. Hence, the structure of private pensions may be51
contributing substantially to the very high rates of early retirement
currently observed in the United States.
Under the contract view of labor markets, pension accrual profiles
might be thought of as carrot and stick incentives to continue working
diligently to some age and to retire at a subsequent age. This presumes
that pension accrual profiles are well-understood by both employers and
workers. In our view this is unlikely. The great complexity of pension
provisions makes it quite difficult for either employers or workers, in.
the absence of assistance from actuaries, to calculate correctly their
accrued pension benefits. While a few firms, including the large FIRM
examined here, provide accrual information annually to their workers,
most, apparently, do not. It also appears that many firms with access to
actuaries do not have their actuaries calculate worker-specific accrual.
It is important to understand the effects of pension plan provisions
on the labor force participation of older workers. But the contract view
of the labor market also makes it clear that evaluation of pension
accrual is best considered in conjunction with age-wage compensation
profiles. If, for example, legislation were to prevent the reduction in
the compensation of older workers through pension plan provisions, such
reduction might be sought through reduction of wage and salary earnings,
to conform to age-productivity profiles. In this case, what constitutes
age discrimination, and the potential effects of age discrimination
legislation, must also be considered. A partial view of the whole may
yield decisions with unforeseen and unintended consequences. Pension
plan provisions may provide a graceful way of making adjustments in a52
firm's labor force, and, in particular, in releasing older workers from
the labor force. On the other hand, the decision to continue work at
older ages is not, now, a neutral one. In the words of tax analysts, the
playing field is far from flat. Should individual preferences for work
versus retirement be constrained by the implicit wage tax structure of
pension plans?
The backloading of pension accrual in the presence of limited worker
and employer understanding of such backloading raises a variety of
important questions. Do workers over- or under-value their accrued
vested pension benefits? Do workers over- or under-save because they
under- or over-value their pensions? Are workers who leave highly
backloaded firms prior to the age of early retirement, at which age
accrual is often very substantial, aware of the often substantial pension
costs of their actions? Is accrual backloading raising the economic
costs of early disability, because workers who become disabled prior to
the age of early retirement receive less generous pensions then those who
remain through early retirement? Should employers be required to provide
workers with annual statements detailing accrued vested benefits as well
as the time path of future projected pension accrual? These and related
questions may need to be asked by employers, workers, the United States
Congress.53
Footnotes
*Boston University and National Bureau of Economic Research.
**Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research.
We thank John Bound for providing some very useful data and William
M. Lieber of the Joint Committee on Taxation for many helpful discussions
concerning recent pension legislation.
1. The origins of the "bonding" model in which future compensation in
excess of productivity binds the worker's performance date from the work
of Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979, 1981). More recently,
efficiency wage models of the labor market have appeared which also
stress the need to provide an extra incentive for enhanced worker
behavior (e.g., Stofft, 1984; Yellen, 1984; Stiglitz and Shapiro, 1984;
and Bulow and Summers, 1985). While several of these models ignore
dynamic aspects of the worker-employer relationship, the efficiency wage
literature as a whole seems to reinforce the view that deferred
compensation can be an important incentive mechanism.54
References
Aaron, Henry J.1982. Economic Effects of Social Security. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Blinder, Alan. 1982."Private Pensions and Public Pensions: Theory and
Fact," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 902
(June).
Blinder, Alan and Roger Cordon. 1980. "Market Wages, Reservation Wages
and Retirement," Journal of Public Economics 14: 277-308.
Blinder, Alan, Roger Cordon, and Donald Wise. 1980. "Reconsidering the
Work Disincentive Effects of Social Security," National Tax Journal
33, (December): 431-42.
__________1981."Life Cycle Savings and Bequests: Cross-Sectional
Estimates of the Life Cycle Model." National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 619, (January).
Boskin, Michael. 1977. "Social Security and Retirement Decisions,"
Economic Inquiry XV, (January): 1-25.
Boskin, Michael and Michael Hurd. 1978. "The Effect of Social Security
on Early Retirement," Journal of Public Economics X, (December):
361-77.
Bulow, J. 1979."Analysis of Pension Funding Under ERISA." National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.402.
Burkhauser, Richard V. 1977. "An Asset Maximization Approach to Early
Social Security Acceptance." Discussion Paper 463-77, Institute for
Research on Poverty. Madison: University of Wisconsin.55
Burkhauser, Richard V. and John A. Turner. 1978."A Time-Series
Analysis on Social Security and its Effect on the Market Work of Men
at Younger Ages," Journal of Political Economy (August).
Burkhauser, Richard V. and John Turner. 1981. "Can Twenty Five Million
Americans Be Wrong? --AResponse to Blinder, Gordon and Wise,"
National Tax Journal 34, (December): 467-72.
Burtless, Gary and J. Hausman. 1978. "'Double Dipping': The Combined
Effects of Social Security and Civil Service Pensions on Employee
Retirement," Journal of Political Economy 18: 139-160.
Burtless, Gary and Robert A. Moffitt. 1984. "The Effects Of Social
Security On The Labor Supply Of The Aged," in Henry Aaron and Gary
Burtless, eds. ,Retirementand Economic Behavior. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 135-74.
Burtless, Gary and R. Moffitt. 1986. "Social Security, the Earnings
Test, and the Age at Retirement," Public Finance Quarterly 14:
3-27.
Campbell, C. D. and R. G. Campbell. 1976. "Conflicting Views on the
Effect of Old-age and Survivors' Insurance on Retirement," Economic
Inquiry XIV, (September): 369-88.
Clark, Robert L. and Stephen A. Gohmann. 1982. "Retirement and the
Acceptance of Social Security Benefits." Mimeographed. Raleigh:
North Carolina State University.
Crawford, V. and D. Lilien. 1981. "Social Security and the Retirement
Decision," Quarterly Journal of Economics XCVI, (August): 509-29.56
Diamond, P. and J. Hausman. 1984. "The Retirement and Unemployment
Behavior of Older Men," in H. Aaron and C. Burtless, eds.,
Retirement and Economic Behavior. Washington, D.C. :Brookings
Institution, 97-134.
Fields, Gary and Olivia Mitchell. "Economic Determinants of the Optimal
Retirement Age: An Empirical Investigation," The Journal of Human
Resources 19: 245-62.
Fields, Gary S. and Olivia Mitchell. 1982. "The Effects of Pensions and
Earnings on Retirement: A Review Essay," in R. Ehrenberg, ed.,
Research in Labor Economics 5: 115-156. Greenwich, CT: JAL Press.
__________1983."Economic Incentives to Retire: A Qualitative Choice
Approach." National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.
1096.
_________1984."The Economics of Retirement Behavior," Journal of
Labor Economics 2, (January): 84-105.
__________1985.Retirement, Pensions, and Social Security.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Irelan, L.1976. "Retirement History Study: Introduction," in U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security
Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, Almost 65:
Baseline Data from the Retirement History Study. Washington, D.C.
GPO.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. 1978."Social Security, Time for Reform," in
Federal Tax Reform: Myth or Reality. San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies (September).57
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. and Daniel Smith. 1983. Pensions in the American
Economy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. and David A. Wise. 1984. "Labor Compensation and
the Structure of Private Pensions Plans: Evidence for Contractual
Versus Spot Labor Markets." National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper No. 1290.
__________1987.Pension Compensation and Retirement Incentives:
The Wage Carrot and the Pension Stick. W.E. UpJohn Institute for
Employment Research monograph.
Lazear, E.P. 1981. "Severance Pay, Pensions, Mobility, and the
Efficiency of Work Incentives." Mimeograph, University of Chicago.
_________1983."Pensions as Severance Pay." Chapter 3 in Zvi Bodie
and John B. Shoven, eds. ,FinancialAspects of the United States
Pension System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Parsons, Donald 0.1980. "The Decline in Male Labor Force
Participation," Journal of Political Economy 88, (February):
117-134,
Pellechio, Anthony J.1978. "The Social Security Earnings Test, Labor
Supply Distortions, and Foregone Payroll Tax Revenue." National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 272, (August).
Quinn, Joseph P.1977. "Microeconomic Determinants of Early Retirement:
A Cross-Sectional View of White Married Men," The Journal of Human
Resources XII(3), (Summer): 329-46.
Ransom, Roger L., and Richard Sutch. 1986. "The Labor of Older
Americans: Retirement of Men On and Off the Job, 1870-1937," The
Journal of Economic History 61(1) (March).